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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Agenda item 61
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 4 February 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 28 January 1998 (A/52/779-S/1998/81) addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations in connection with the construction by the Government of Cyprus of the military airbase in Paphos.

In this context, I should like to emphasize the self-evident principle that no country can relinquish its right of self-defence or neglect its responsibility to protect its citizens from aggression. As a sovereign and independent State, the Republic of Cyprus does nothing more than exercise this inalienable right, which is recognized in the Charter of the United Nations and general international law, through the enhancement of the defensive capabilities of the National Guard. This is especially true, given the fact that the Republic of Cyprus has been the victim of Turkish aggression, as a result of which 37 per cent of its territory remains under military occupation since 1974.

In a series of resolutions the United Nations has repeatedly demanded respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey has failed to comply with these resolutions and continues to occupy militarily the northern part of the island. The Secretary-General has described the occupied area as "one of the most densely militarized areas in the world".

After almost 24 years of impasse, during which Turkey has steadfastly refused to withdraw or even reduce the occupation forces, the need for the Republic of Cyprus to take sufficient measures to defend itself in the face of this continuing threat becomes even more imperative than before. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus, like any other Government, has both the

responsibility and the duty to ensure the security of its citizens who live in the shadow of a long-standing serious threat.

In its efforts to redress to some extent the overwhelming imbalance, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus has undertaken an effort to bolster the island's defences. It is sufficient to mention that Turkey maintains in the occupied area of the island a force of 36,000 heavily armed troops, which are constantly upgraded and modernized. All the units of the occupying force are at the level of 100 per cent battle readiness and manning. The huge offensive capability of the occupation army is spearheaded by more than 300 modern tanks. Air support is available at a less than 10-minute distance from the neighbouring Turkish mainland, where a force of at least 80 F-16s and other combat aircraft are stationed.

The Republic of Cyprus does not possess its own airforce. The Government of the Republic has, on numerous occasions, stated publicly that the base will be used only to defend the island in the event of a further Turkish aggression. It would be naive to argue that Cyprus intends to launch an offensive against Turkey. The only objective is to provide Cyprus with a more credible defence in the face of the continuing illegal Turkish occupation and repeated threats against the security of Cyprus.

The reaction of Turkey to the upgrading of Cyprus's defence has the sole intention of maintaining the hugely imbalanced military status quo on the island, which the international community has condemned and the Security Council has unequivocally considered unacceptable.

The Turkish reactions to the deployment of purely defensive weapons and the construction of a base by the Republic of Cyprus as a shield against further aggression can only be understood in the light of statements such as those made by Mr. Gurel, Minister of State of Turkey, who specifically stated that "there are weapons systems being installed in Cyprus, which are endangering our military supremacy there", or by Mr. Sezgin, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister, who said that "if [the base] is directed against Turkey it is too little".

It is well known that the Government of the Republic has made the continuation of its defence programme conditional upon a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem through peaceful means or the demilitarization of the island. Hence, since 1993, President Clerides has submitted a complete proposal for the demilitarization of the island. This proposal is still on the table. Its acceptance by Turkey, or the display of genuine will to consider it seriously, would greatly facilitate, for everyone concerned, dealing with and eventually overcoming the present difficulties.

Moreover, one cannot help but comment on the Turkish Representative's audacity in referring to the Security Council resolutions, which his own country blatantly violates. We challenge Turkey to implement the United Nations resolutions in their totality, withdraw its occupation troops and settlers and restore the human rights of the people of Cyprus as a whole. This would lead automatically to the achievement of peace and thus eliminate the need for defence spending.

Finally, I would like to point out that the threatening statements contained in the letter of the Turkish Representative do not constitute, in any way, a new or, indeed, a surprising element. They simply reflect the consistent pattern of Turkey's foreign policy, which uses threats in order to thwart the legitimate exercise of other countries' rights under international law. Hence, I would urge you to remind the Government of Turkey of its obligations and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Article 2, paragraph 4.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the fifty-second session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Sotirios ZACKHEOS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1125 (1997) of 6 August 1997 and 1136 (1997) of 6 November 1997,

Taking note of the third report to the Security Council by the International Committee for the Follow-up of the Bangui Agreements (S/1998/86),

Taking note also of the letter dated 28 January 1998 from the President of the Central African Republic to the President of the Security Council (S/1998/88) and of the letter dated 4 February 1998 to the President of the Security Council from the President of Gabon, on behalf of the members of the International Committee for the Follow-up of the Bangui Agreements (S/1998/97),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 23 January 1998 (S/1998/61) submitted to the Council in accordance with Security Council resolution 1136 (1997),

Expressing appreciation for the neutral and impartial way in which the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) has carried out its mandate, in close cooperation with the Central African authorities, and noting with satisfaction that MISAB has contributed to stabilizing the situation in the Central African Republic, in particular through the supervision of the surrendering of arms,

Noting that the States participating in MISAB and the Central African Republic have decided to extend its mandate (S/1997/561, appendix I) in order to complete its mission with the prospect of the United Nations establishing a peacekeeping operation,

Stressing the importance of regional stability and, in this context, fully supporting the efforts made by the Member States participating in the International Mediation Committee established by the nineteenth Summit of the Heads of State and Governments of France and Africa and by the members of the International Committee for the Follow-up of the Bangui Agreements,

Stressing also the need for all signatories of the Bangui Agreements to continue to cooperate fully in respecting and implementing these Agreements in order to help to foster the conditions for long-term stability in the Central African Republic,

Determining that the situation in the Central African Republic continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

1. Welcomes the efforts made by the Member States participating in MISAB and by those States providing support to them, and their readiness to maintain these efforts;

2. Welcomes the support provided by the United Nations Development Programme to the International Committee for the Follow-up of the Bangui Agreements and encourages it to continue this support;

3. Calls upon the parties in the Central African Republic to complete the implementation without delay of the provisions of the Bangui Agreements and also calls for the fulfilment of the commitments expressed in the letter of 8 January 1998 to the Secretary-General from the President of the Central African Republic (S/1998/61, annex);

4. Approves the continued conduct by Member States participating in MISAB of the operation in a neutral and impartial way to achieve its objective as set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1125 (1997);

5. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Member States participating in MISAB and those States providing logistical support to ensure security and freedom of movement of their personnel;

6. Decides that the authorization referred to in paragraph 5 above will be initially extended until 16 March 1998;

7. Recalls that the expenses and logistical support for MISAB will be borne on a voluntary basis in accordance with article 11 of the mandate of MISAB and encourages Member States to contribute to the Trust Fund for the Central African Republic;

8. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General, as contained in his report of 23 January 1998, to appoint a Special Representative to the Central African Republic, and expresses its belief that the prompt appointment of such a representative could assist the parties in the implementation of the Bangui Agreements and provide support to other activities of the United Nations in the country;

9. Reiterates its call to all States, international organizations and financial institutions to assist in post-conflict development in the Central African Republic;

10. Requests the Member States participating in MISAB to provide a report to the Security Council through the Secretary-General before the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report for its consideration, no later than 23 February 1998, on the situation in the Central African Republic, with recommendations regarding the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation, including the structure, specific goals and financial implications of such an operation, and with information on the implementation of the Bangui Agreements and on the commitments expressed in the letter to the Secretary-General from the President of the Central African Republic of 8 January 1998;

12. Expresses its intention to take a decision by 16 March 1998 on the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic on the basis of the report referred to in paragraph 11 above;

13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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THIRD REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997 and to the presidential statement of 14 November 1997 (S/PRST/1997/52). It covers developments in Sierra Leone since my second report, dated 5 December 1997 (S/1997/958).

II. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1132 (1997)

Dispatch of a technical survey team

2. By a letter dated 16 December 1997 (S/1997/980), the President of the Security Council conveyed to me the support expressed by members of the Council for the implementation of the two proposals I had made in my previous report, namely, the dispatch of a technical survey team to Sierra Leone and the reopening of a small liaison office in Sierra Leone.

3. Between 10 and 17 January 1998, a technical survey team led by my Special Envoy to Sierra Leone, Mr. Francis G. Okelo, visited Conakry, Monrovia and Freetown. The objectives of the visits were to assess the political, military and security situation in Sierra Leone, to discuss with the junta the implementation of the peace agreement signed in Conakry on 23 October 1997, to consult with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on the planning undertaken so far by its Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, to carry out the military tasks listed in the Conakry Agreement and to examine installations and infrastructure in the subregion, including airports and seaports, medical facilities, engineering works and the availability and reliability of equipment, supplies and services that might be used by a future United Nations military presence, should the Security Council decide to deploy one.

4. During its visit, the team met three times in Conakry with President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and members of his Cabinet, who welcomed the proposals contained in my previous report, and with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Guinea and other Guinean government officials. With the full cooperation of the Guinean Government and the assistance of Guinean officials, the team also inspected the airport, seaport and medical facilities in Conakry.

5. In a statement issued in Conakry on 17 January 1998, President Kabbah welcomed the efforts of my Special Envoy to secure the implementation of the Conakry Agreement and the visit of the technical survey team to Freetown. He placed particular emphasis on the need for an early deployment of ECOMOG troops and United Nations military observers in Sierra Leone. On 24 January, Mr. Okelo met in Lungi, Sierra Leone, with Vice-President Albert Demby and held extensive discussions with him on the various aspects of the peace plan. As part of his consultations with all parties involved in the Sierra Leonean peace process, my Special Envoy also held meetings with representatives of Sierra Leonean civil society and organizations based in Conakry in order to apprise them of the efforts the United Nations was making to help implement the Conakry Agreement.

6. In Monrovia, members of the team met with ECOMOG High Command officers to discuss the concept of operations drawn up for the implementation of the Conakry Agreement, including the development of plans for the deployment of ECOMOG troops inside Sierra Leone beyond their present bases, and for disarming and demobilizing the Sierra Leonean combatants.

7. In their discussions with the ECOMOG Force Commander and other senior officers, members of the team found that some effort had been made to identify the logistical and equipment requirements of the ECOMOG force, and some preliminary planning had been initiated. On 24 January 1998, my Special Envoy received an outline plan for ECOMOG deployment and the ECOMOG concept of operations, but much remains to be done before the United Nations could be in a position to draw up its own comprehensive plans, which, in accordance with the Conakry Agreement, must be based on an ECOMOG concept of operations.

8. In Freetown, the team met with the political and military leaders of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) for a series of general and technical discussions. The team also visited United Nations House in the centre of the city. While the vehicles and some other equipment that had been previously positioned in the United Nations warehouse for use in a possible peacekeeping operation had been looted, the United Nations offices, including the office of my Special Envoy, had been maintained in working condition by the local staff.

9. The team performed the necessary technical on-site inspections, including inspection of the seaport, heliport and airfield infrastructure, warehouses and storage facilities and locations for office accommodation and living quarters in Freetown. While many of these had suffered looting and sustained damage and neglect, the team considered that with a certain amount of rehabilitation work they could be rendered usable in the event of a United Nations deployment.

Security situation

10. The technical survey team found that while the junta appeared to be in control of Freetown, the security situation in the countryside remained highly volatile and did not allow the United Nations group to travel outside the capital. In its discussions with its various interlocutors, the team received reports that military activity was persisting in the east and south of the country, particularly around Bo and Kenema. Intensified guerrilla-style actions against the junta forces were being conducted by an organization called the Civil Defence Unit (CDU). CDU, which apparently comprises the Kamajors and similar groupings of traditional village-based hunters in the north and centre of the country, claims to control all major roads in Sierra Leone.

11. In a statement released on 9 January 1998, CDU indicated that it would cooperate with the implementation of the Conakry Agreement only in the event of a firm commitment by the junta to abide by its provisions, the rapid deployment of ECOMOG throughout Sierra Leone and the disarmament of all combatants, including RUF and the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLMF). The representative of CDU whom the technical survey team met in Conakry, citing security considerations, declined to give the team any detailed indication of the size, armament or distribution of the CDU forces, which are led by Chief Hinga Norman, the Deputy Defence Minister in President Kabbah's Government.

12. According to information received from a variety of sources familiar with conditions in the countryside, the situation in and around the southern town of Bo is extremely tense. The food situation gives rise to particular concern, since the food stocks on which the civilian population of the town depends are running low. Attacks on civilians using the road to Bo have reportedly led to fatalities. In the meantime, fighting has also escalated in other parts of the country.

Meetings between the technical survey team and the junta

13. In his meetings with the Chairman of AFRC, Mr. Johnny Paul Koroma, and other military and political leaders, my Special Envoy reaffirmed the commitment of the United Nations to the full and timely implementation of the Conakry Agreement and of Security Council resolution 1132 (1997), as well as the need to adhere strictly to the timetable for the restoration of constitutional government on 22 April 1998. Mr. Koroma and other members of the junta claimed that, in their view, three issues stood in the way of the implementation of the Conakry Agreement, namely:

(a) The need for the immediate release of Corporal Foday Sankoh, the Deputy Chairman of the junta and head of RUF, who is currently in Nigeria;

(b) The need to exempt RSLMF from the disarmament exercise;

(c) The need to address the "dominant role played by the Nigerian contingent in ECOMOG".

14. In renewing the formal commitment of the junta to the implementation of the Conakry Agreement, Mr. Koroma stressed the need for concrete and timely action to achieve its objectives within the six-month time frame set out therein. He put forward proposals that he claimed were aimed at addressing the three issues mentioned above, as well as other outstanding matters not dealt with in detail in the Agreement. According to the junta, the proposals would require the establishment of the following four committees:

(a) A coordinating and general-purpose committee;

(b) A disarmament, demobilization and reintegration committee;

(c) A humanitarian assistance coordinating committee;

(d) A committee on the formation of a broad-based government of national unity.

Mr. Koroma proposed that, in addition to the junta, the membership of the committees would include, as appropriate, representatives of the ECOWAS Committee of Five, ECOMOG, international and national non-governmental organizations and the United Nations.

15. The junta also asserted that the confidence-building measures contained in the Conakry Agreement had not been carried out, including the assessment visit that was to have been conducted on 20 November 1997 by the ECOWAS Committee of Five Ministerial Assessment Team and the provision of humanitarian assistance. The junta expressed its readiness for dialogue with ECOWAS, as provided for in the Agreement, to resolve the issues it said were blocking the implementation of the Agreement and, in that context, welcomed the arrival of the technical survey team and the proposal to reopen a liaison office. It indicated that the deployment of United Nations military observers would also be welcome.

16. The junta also made strong representations to the team concerning what it considered to be the use of excessive force by ECOMOG in subjecting Freetown and other locations in Sierra Leone to naval and aerial bombardment. It also complained of the harmful effects on the civilian population of what it considered to be overly vigorous enforcement of both ECOWAS and United Nations sanctions by ECOMOG forces.

17. The technical survey team presented to the junta a detailed list of questions concerning plans that should have been made by the junta for the disarmament and demobilization of its combatants and confidence-building measures that the junta itself could take in order to demonstrate its commitment to the implementation of the Agreement. In reply to those questions, the junta, in reaffirming its commitment to the Conakry Agreement, cited numerous provisions of the Abidjan Peace Agreement (S/1996/1034, annex) signed by the Government of Sierra Leone and RUF on 30 November 1996, as well as of the Conakry Agreement. The junta's reply also recalled the proposals made by Mr. Koroma, which are outlined in paragraphs 13 to 15 above. The junta's reply to the technical questions posed by the team, which was received on 20 January 1998, will be taken into account in future discussions of the role to

be played by the United Nations based on the comprehensive concept of operations to be finalized by ECOMOG (see para. 36 below).

18. The team requested from the junta further information concerning reports that it had enlarged an airstrip at Magburaka and had received deliveries of weapons there in violation of the embargo imposed by the Security Council in its resolution 1132 (1997). Those deliveries reportedly included surface-to-air missiles and other matériel allegedly paid for by the sale of diamonds mined in Sierra Leone. The junta has denied those reports, and the team was unable to verify them. During and after its stay in Freetown, the team encountered persistent reports that illegal arms sales were being paid for by the sale of diamonds. Members of the junta have also travelled outside the country in violation of the travel ban imposed by the Council in resolution 1132 (1997).

Other action taken pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997)

19. On 8 January 1998 the Chairman of ECOWAS and Head of State of Nigeria, General Sani Abacha, wrote to inform me of the outcome of the seventh meeting of the ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, held in Abuja on 19 December 1997.

20. The ministers noted that there had been some violations of the ECOWAS and United Nations sanctions imposed on the junta in Sierra Leone. Those violations related specifically to the arms embargo and travel restrictions imposed on members of the illegal regime and their families. The ministers therefore called upon all countries and, in particular, ECOWAS member States, to adhere strictly to those sanctions. They also requested countries harbouring members of the military junta, their families and all others on the restricted list to repatriate such persons to Sierra Leone.

21. The Ministers were informed of the upgrading of an airstrip at Magburaka into a full-fledged airport by the illegal regime for the illegal importation of arms and other supplies in violation of the sanctions. The ministers mandated ECOMOG to ensure that the airstrip was not used. General Abacha stated in his letter that the delays in the implementation of the Conakry Agreement were attributable solely to lack of cooperation on the part of the junta and its continued intransigence, and he accused them of stalling for time. In addition, he said, the junta had continued to carry out unprovoked attacks on ECOMOG peacekeepers.

22. Stating the need for ECOWAS and the United Nations to implement the Agreement without further delay, General Abacha requested that I help accelerate efforts towards the deployment of a United Nations military observer mission to Sierra Leone and to solicit the assistance of the international community for the operations of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone.

23. Since my previous report, a number of States have reported to me, in compliance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1132 (1997), concerning the steps they have taken to give effect to the provisions contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the resolution relating to the sanctions imposed by the Council on Sierra Leone. Those countries are Australia, Austria, Brazil, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, Greece, Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg (on behalf of

the European Union), Norway, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

24. On 15 January 1998, the United Kingdom Special Representative for Sierra Leone, Mr. John Flynn, visited United Nations Headquarters to participate in an ad hoc meeting of donors and other interested parties convened by the British Government. The purpose of the meeting was to consider what additional steps could be taken by the international community to support the work of ECOWAS in facilitating the implementation of the Conakry Agreement.

25. The parties reached a number of conclusions concerning the finalization by ECOMOG of a comprehensive concept of operations and the identification of its logistical and equipment requirements; the establishment of a trust fund to assist ECOMOG; the deployment of United Nations military personnel, subject to authorization by the Security Council; and the serious humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone.

III. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

26. The humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone has continued to deteriorate. In the absence of new supplies of food aid, commercial food is increasingly scarce and expensive in urban areas. This is primarily attributable to the overall decline in the country as a result of the 25 May 1997 coup as well as the scarcity of fuel, which has a direct impact on food prices because of increased transportation costs. In Freetown, the price of the main staple, rice, has tripled since the coup, severely affecting the population. Attempts by the authorities to fix the price of rice at an artificially low level have proved unsuccessful, since wholesalers have merely withheld stocks, preferring to sell in more attractive consumer markets in mining areas or to trade on the black market. The reduced purchasing power of the civilian population since the coup has exacerbated the already precarious situation.

27. In rural areas in the southern and eastern provinces the situation is particularly acute, as food distribution has also been affected by the deteriorating security situation resulting from intensified conflict between the Kamajors and the AFRC/RUF, now known as the People's Army, during December 1997. The benefits of the abundant rice harvest have been negated by looting and the increased incidence of rural "food taxes" imposed on civilians by armed elements, which cause farmers to hoard their harvest rather than risk transporting it to market. In the towns of Bo and Kenema the situation is particularly severe, as the amount of food being imported into those areas is negligible. As a result, the civilian population is entirely dependent on existing supplies.

28. Existing stocks of relief food within Sierra Leone are almost exhausted, as no food aid has entered Sierra Leone since the coup. The resulting virtual halt in food aid distribution has already had an impact on the beneficiaries of vulnerable group feeding programmes, institutions such as hospitals and the internally displaced, currently estimated at 150,000 people. The 5,500 Liberian

refugees in Freetown are particularly vulnerable, since they lack the family support structures available to Sierra Leoneans.

29. Although humanitarian agencies have continued to transport modest quantities of medical and other non-food supplies across the Guinean border, those operations have been insufficient to meet the growing needs of a collapsing primary health care system. Significant quantities of supplies, together with logistics and personnel support, are required to conduct a much-needed child immunization campaign.

30. The requirement that ECOMOG inspect humanitarian shipments at the border of Sierra Leone and Guinea has now been entrusted by ECOWAS to the Guinean army. However, the Government of Guinea has also requested that ECOWAS provide inspectors to supervise the task of the Guinean troops. ECOWAS has requested United Nations assistance in financing this deployment of inspectors, and United Nations agencies have indicated that they will do this on a cost-sharing basis.

31. In view of the concerns expressed in the Security Council and by others, a United Nations inter-agency assessment mission will be sent to Sierra Leone at the beginning of February to undertake a technical analysis of the humanitarian situation, including the humanitarian impact of sanctions, and to consider the difficulties encountered by humanitarian agencies in providing assistance to vulnerable groups.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

32. Although the junta claims that it remains committed to the implementation of the Conakry Agreement, the situation in Sierra Leone remains deeply preoccupying and requires the urgent attention of the international community. In particular, it is important to develop and finalize the necessary deployment, disarmament and demobilization plans if the Conakry Agreement is to be implemented and the constitutional order restored in accordance with the timetable envisaged in the Agreement. It would therefore be premature at this stage to present to the Security Council a full concept of operations or an estimate of force size and structure in respect of a possible United Nations military presence in Sierra Leone.

33. My Special Envoy stands ready to assist in efforts to overcome the obstacles blocking the implementation of the Conakry Agreement. In this context, I welcome the proposed convening in New York of the Ministerial Meeting of the Committee of Five, which could give a much-needed impetus to the process of dialogue as well as to the full and timely implementation of the Conakry Agreement.

34. I also intend to re-establish the United Nations liaison office in Sierra Leone, initially staffed with a political officer, a military adviser and a humanitarian officer under the direction of my Special Envoy and supported by the necessary staff, including a security officer. In due course, the liaison office could be expanded to comprise human rights and information officers. The staff of the office would maintain contacts with the members of the junta and civil society in Sierra Leone. The Special Envoy and his staff would also

facilitate talks with the junta and with ECOWAS and ECOMOG on various aspects of the implementation of the Agreement. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Development Programme in Freetown and to all United Nations staff members there for their steadfastness in remaining at their posts in often trying conditions.

35. At the same time, I invite the Security Council to consider the deployment of a small military liaison cell of up to 10, with the necessary support staff, to assess and report on the military situation within Sierra Leone and coordinate with ECOMOG and with other United Nations agencies in the areas of ECOMOG deployment, in the capital and, conditions permitting, in other areas of the country. I will seek the necessary security guarantees from all parties. In my view, the presence of the military liaison cell, which would operate under the authority of my Special Envoy, would also signal the commitment of the Council and the international community to the implementation of the Conakry Agreement and would serve as an important confidence-building measure. I recommend that the costs related to the military liaison cell be met through peacekeeping assessments, and I intend to present this recommendation to the General Assembly in due course.

36. My Special Envoy and his staff will also maintain the contacts they have established both with the ECOMOG High Command and the junta with a view to assisting in the finalization of a comprehensive concept of operations for deployment throughout Sierra Leone and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Sierra Leonean combatants into civilian life. United Nations planning would be completed on the basis of such a concept as well as the operational data acquired during the visit of the technical survey team.

37. The United Nations will work with the international community to try to generate the logistical, technical and financial support that will be required for ECOWAS to pursue its efforts to carry out the Conakry Agreement. I call upon Member States to stand ready to offer generous assistance in this regard.

38. I note that the ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone on 19 December 1997 called upon all countries and, in particular, on ECOWAS member States to adhere strictly to the sanctions. Reports of persistent violations of the Security Council arms embargo are of great concern, as such violations could seriously impede the peace process.

39. The continuing efforts being made by the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone and its Chairman, Chief Tom Ikimi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, deserve commendation and support. Particular appreciation is also due to the Government of Guinea for the preparations it has been making for the long-awaited launch of cross-border humanitarian operations in Sierra Leone and for the support and assistance it extended to my Special Envoy and to the technical survey team during its visit.

40. At the same time, I am concerned at the plight of civilians affected by the strict enforcement of sanctions on Sierra Leone and by the conduct of hostilities within the country, including in the area around Bo. The report of the inter-agency humanitarian assessment mission that will visit Sierra Leone early in February to analyse the humanitarian situation and the effect of

sanctions on the civilian population should facilitate the early start of cross-border humanitarian relief efforts in order to alleviate the suffering of innocent civilians. I salute the people of Sierra Leone for the forbearance with which they are enduring their ordeal, and wish to assure them that the United Nations, in close cooperation with ECOWAS, will continue to do everything in its power to facilitate the restoration of the constitutional order in their country.

41. I will keep the Security Council informed of further United Nations activity and other developments in Sierra Leone in the weeks to come.

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LETTER DATED 5 FEBRUARY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 5 February 1998 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, as well as the appendix thereto, which contains the observations of the Iraqi party on the report that you submitted to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 7 of Council resolution 1143 (1997), issued on 1 February 1998 as document S/1998/90.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter, and its annex and the appendix thereto, circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 5 February 1998 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

The Government of the Republic of Iraq has considered the report that you submitted to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 7 of Council resolution 1143 (1997), issued on 1 February 1998 as document S/1998/90. You will find attached hereto our observations on the report.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and the appendix thereto circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF

Baghdad, 5 February 1998

Appendix

Observations of the Government of the Republic of Iraq on the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, issued on 1 February 1998 as document S/1998/90

Paragraph 6:

Paragraph 6 of the memorandum of understanding indicates that the Iraqi Government has sole responsibility for preparing the purchase and distribution plan. Paragraph 6 of the Secretary-General's report thus violates both the letter and the spirit of the memorandum, since it refers to a plan describing in detail the distribution of increased revenue among certain sectors, in accordance with modalities that take no account of the Iraqi Government's role and responsibilities.

We categorically reject this formula and wish to state that any addition to the purchase and distribution plan under phase III remains the sole responsibility of the Iraqi Government in accordance with paragraph 6 of the memorandum of understanding, which explicitly so indicates, and in accordance with the procedures established for phases I to III. Our position, moreover, was reaffirmed by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs in his letter dated 12 January 1998 to the Secretary-General. The Iraqi Government will not endorse any plan for the distribution of increased income if it is prepared by any party other than Iraq.

Paragraph 10:

We have reaffirmed on several occasions, in letters from the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General and in other official communications, that the 180-day period referred to in paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 986 (1995) began on the date on which the Secretary-General informed the Iraqi Government that he had approved the purchase and distribution plan, as was the case in phases I and II. Our position on that point remains unchanged. The Iraqi Government therefore refuses to be held responsible for the pause that occurred between the adoption of the Security Council resolution extending the memorandum of understanding and the approval of the purchase and distribution plan by the Secretary-General. If this delay had regrettable consequences (late arrival of humanitarian supplies), the Secretary-General should have referred to that fact and described the difficulties that arose in connection with the approval of contracts, whether in the form of the obstacles encountered or the methods followed for considering contracts for the purchase of foodstuffs, medicine and other supplies for essential needs. We have already referred to these problems in numerous letters to the Secretary-General and the Chairman of the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), but we have never received any reply.

Paragraph 12:

The Iraqi Government rejects paragraph 12, which clearly violates the spirit of resolution 986 (1995) and of paragraph 4 of the memorandum of

understanding, which states that the arrangement provided for in the memorandum is an exceptional and temporary measure. Paragraph 12 indicates that the plan is ongoing and permanent.

Paragraph 18:

It goes without saying that the purpose of resolution 986 (1995) and of the memorandum of understanding is to meet the priority requirements of the Iraqi people, as indicated in paragraph 1 of the Secretary-General's report, hence the need to ensure that all supplementary resources are used for that purpose. However, the tendency is to increase the funds used for administering the programme, which will unquestionably result in a reduction in the additional resources that should be allocated for the purchase of humanitarian supplies. The Iraqi Government therefore rejects the use of supplementary resources for achieving goals other than the humanitarian goals referred to in the resolution.

Paragraph 21:

(a) In our observations on paragraph 10, we reiterated that the pumping of oil should begin on the date on which the Secretary-General approves the purchase and distribution plan, as was the case in phases I and II. As we have already indicated, we reject that paragraph.

(b) With regard to the Secretary-General's proposal concerning the preparation of a single, ongoing purchase and distribution plan, we consider this proposal totally unacceptable. In our observations on paragraph 12, we pointed out that this proposal not only contradicts paragraph 4 of the memorandum of understanding but also has as its aim introducing the principle of a single, ongoing plan to take the place of implementation of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991). The Secretary-General should have indicated that Security Council resolution 986 (1995) was adopted to meet temporary humanitarian requirements and that efforts should be made to implement, as rapidly as possible, paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991), as a first step towards lifting the embargo imposed against Iraq.

Paragraph 25:

The Iraqi Government rejects implementation by the special agencies of projects in the 15 governorates under the memorandum of understanding, because project implementation falls within the sovereignty and competence of the Iraqi Government. The purchase and distribution plan should have a single goal: ensuring the supply of goods, equipment and other articles in accordance with the plan.

Paragraphs 26, 27 and 28:

We were very surprised to note that paragraphs 26, 27 and 28 deal with the electricity sector with great enthusiasm and in great detail but only as regards the three northern governorates (Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah) and that for unacceptable reasons they make no reference to the other governorates of Iraq. The issue of electricity should have been dealt with on a national basis, in particular because Iraq has a single distribution system. Moreover, what should

have been discussed is electricity generation, not distribution. On that particular point, we wish to stress that it is the Iraqi Government that is responsible for taking decisions relating to the electricity sector and setting priorities for the different governorates. As we have already indicated, the purchase and distribution plan is an exceptional and temporary measure whose sole aim is to meet urgent requirements and not to ensure the implementation, in the electricity sector, of projects with medium- and long-term consequences that fall within the competence of the Iraqi Government. In view of all these considerations, we categorically reject the conditions, proposals and estimated costs referred to in paragraphs 26, 27 and 28.

Paragraph 30

In a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, we have already informed the Secretary-General of our comments on his report pursuant to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1111 (1997), namely, that the issue of vulnerable groups lies outside the framework of the memorandum of understanding. It is the responsibility of the Republic of Iraq, which is playing its part and carrying out its responsibilities in a proper manner. We therefore see no need for this issue to be forcibly inserted into the memorandum of understanding. We reject any reference to or suggestion concerning the matter, since there are numerous cases and needs in a large number of fields which cannot be met other than by the complete lifting of the sanctions. The first step towards this is to implement paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) as soon as possible. It cannot be done by means of selective measures or by interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq.

Paragraph 37

We have already stressed in paragraph 18 above that it has been decided that the monies available under the memorandum of understanding should be devoted to the provision of humanitarian goods and supplies and other essentials. The Government of the Republic of Iraq is entirely responsible for the setting-up of projects.

Paragraph 40

We affirm the need to implement the plan for the education sector put forward by the Government of the Republic of Iraq. This covers the provision of equipment and essential supplies for schools and laboratories, and any materials required for all levels of education, not the building of schools.

Paragraph 51

The Government of the Republic of Iraq reiterates its unconditional rejection of a single, ongoing distribution plan, since that contravenes the spirit and the letter of Security Council resolution 986 (1995) and the memorandum of understanding, which provided that this measure should be exceptional and temporary.

Paragraph 52

The Government of the Republic of Iraq stresses that it does not agree to any increased expenditure by United Nations agencies on administrative requirements, since the proposed increase is covered by the third stage of the memorandum of understanding, which has already set aside the necessary sums. Any such increase will be at the expense of the humanitarian goal of the resolution and the memorandum of understanding. Any increase in revenue is supposed to be devoted to humanitarian purposes, and not to be subjected to any form of deduction or used for additional administrative expenses.

Paragraph 55

The oil-pumping operations have been carried out in a steady manner and within the time-frame agreed upon with effect from the date of the Secretary-General's approval of the purchase and distribution plan. This is the course that has been followed in phases I and II. Therefore, if no increase has been approved, no oil will be pumped before Iraq has prepared a supplementary plan concerning the increase and the Secretary-General has approved that plan.

Paragraph 59

The Government of the Republic of Iraq reiterates yet again, as it has done on many occasions, its rejection of a single, ongoing purchase and distribution plan, since such a plan is in contravention of Security Council resolution 986 (1995) and the memorandum of understanding. We are surprised that the Secretary-General should make statements in this respect, regardless of the serious work that has been done in implementation of paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) as the first step on the road to complete and comprehensive lifting of the sanctions.

Paragraph 61

(a) The United Nations programme has failed to ensure the needs of the three northern governorates of Dohuk, Irbil and Sulaymaniyah in the electricity sector from the points of view of priority and periods of preparation. These governorates have received only a small proportion of what was allocated to them in the three purchase and distribution plans, and we have proof of that. We therefore affirm that this activity is the absolute responsibility of the Government of the Republic of Iraq.

(b) This paragraph calls for the involvement of United Nations experts in identifying essential priority measures and their cost. The Government of Iraq stresses that the identification of needs in the electricity sector, and the purchase thereof, is the responsibility of Iraq, and we absolutely reject any alteration or breach of this concept.

Paragraph 63

The tendency apparent in this paragraph is completely divorced from the provisions of paragraph 6 of the memorandum of understanding. This stated that the Government of the Republic of Iraq should have responsibility for the

preparation of a purchase and distribution plan to be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for approval. The Government of the Republic of Iraq is therefore astonished that the Secretary-General, in his capacity as a sponsor of the memorandum of understanding, and being responsible for its proper legal and technical implementation, should make such a proposal and draw up plans as to what the Government of Iraq should undertake. This is unacceptable. We therefore affirm yet again the responsibility of the Government of the Republic of Iraq for the preparation of the plan and its submission to the Secretary-General. Consultations may then be held, in accordance with the practice adopted during the preparations for phases I to III. The provision of additional revenue does not give the Secretary-General the right to disregard the basic provisions that have been instrumental in the preparation of the previous plans.

Paragraph 64

This paragraph refers to the need for additional financial resources to halt the continuing deterioration in the health and nutritional status of the Iraqi people and in the relevant infrastructure, which has a direct impact on the worsening of the situation. However, we see that these additional resources will be subject to the deductions provided for in paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 986 (1995) in addition to other increased expenditure, which will undoubtedly have negative effects on the capacity of the remainder of this revenue to meet the humanitarian goals for which the Secretary-General is calling. The Government of the Republic of Iraq therefore considers that these additional revenues should be exempt from any type of deduction, since the goal of the resolution is humanitarian. It is intended to meet the basic needs of the Iraqi people, not to provide additional sums to pay compensation or for administrative and other expenses. The Government of Iraq therefore totally rejects any increase in deductions made for compensation or administrative expenses.

Paragraph 66

The Government of the Republic of Iraq refuses to approve the allocations contained in annex I and the projects envisaged in addition to distribution plan III set forth in annex II. We reaffirm what we have stated in previous paragraphs as to the need to comply with paragraph 6 of the memorandum of understanding, which gave the Government of the Republic of Iraq exclusive responsibility for preparing the purchase and distribution plan. Any attempt to impose a particular course of action will be a clear breach of the provisions of this memorandum.

UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1998/105
5 February 1998
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 5 FEBRUARY 1998 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to attach the text of a letter dated 4 February 1998 which I received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have it brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

98-02640 (E) 060298 060298

Annex

[Original: English]

Letter dated 4 February 1998 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolution 1088 (1996), I attach the thirteenth monthly report on Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations. I would appreciate your making this report available to the Security Council.

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

Appendix

Thirteenth monthly report to the United Nations Security Council on Stabilization Force operations

1. There are approximately 35,000 troops currently deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia, with contributions from all the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and from 20 non-NATO countries. Over the reporting period (21 December 1997-20 January 1998), most of the temporary reinforcements that had been sent in to support the Republika Srpska Assembly elections redeployed out of theatre.

2. SFOR has continued to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance by means of ground and air patrols. A total of 2,250 sorties were flown by combat aircraft over the reporting period, with the SFOR helicopter fleet flying 156 hours.

3. Over the reporting period, SFOR forces continued to secure the transmission towers used by Srpska Radio Television at Duga Nijva, Udrigovo and Veliki Zep in Multi-National Division North and at Trebevic, and at Leotar in Multi-National Division South-East.

4. On 27 December, SFOR troops ensured a safe environment and freedom of movement for the inaugural meeting of the new Republika Srpska Assembly in Bijeljina and for the subsequent meetings, which took place on 12 and 17 January 1998, all of which were conducted without incident. In addition, following the election of a new Republika Srpska Government in mid-January and in response to a request from the Office of the High Representative, SFOR increased patrols and established observation posts in the vicinity of Republika Srpska government offices in and around Pale. No unusual activities were reported.

Cooperation and compliance by the parties

5. The parties remain generally compliant with most military aspects of the Peace Agreement across the whole area of operations.

6. The inspection and verification of barracks and cantonment sites remains a priority task for SFOR. The operation to reduce those sites by 25 per cent began in June 1997, when SFOR reported 770 sites (323 combat sites and 447 infrastructure sites) and set the deadline of 20 December 1997 for the reduction. Thanks in part to the willingness of both entities, this goal was exceeded, and as of 9 January 1998 there were 534 approved sites in the SFOR area of operations (a total of 255 combat sites and 279 infrastructure sites). SFOR will pursue further site reductions in 1998.

7. During the reporting period, SFOR inspected 253 military weapon storage sites: 96 Bosniac, 77 Bosnian Croat and 80 Bosnian Serb. The following unauthorized weapons were confiscated: from the Bosnian Croats, 1 sniper rifle, 6 rocket-propelled grenades, 12,700 small arms rounds, 40 grenades and 165 mines; from the Bosnian Serbs, 10 had grenades. In addition, on 13 January SFOR

troops confiscated two tons of illegal weapons from the Ozren enclave, south-east of Doboj in the Republika Srpska. Various mortars, nearly 200 grenades and more than 20,000 rounds of ammunition were confiscated and, in line with established policy, will be destroyed.

8. SFOR continues to support the International Police Task Force (IPTF), on a case-by-case basis, in its inspections of local police stations. Over the reporting period the following weapons were confiscated: from the Federation, 14 grenades, 15 mines, 1 rifle, 1 rocket-propelled grenade and 23 small arms rounds; from the Bosnian Serbs, 1 long-barrelled weapon and 10 7.62-mm rounds. All these confiscated weapons will be destroyed after a period of time, to allow for appeals.

9. With respect to the Specialist Police, the Republika Srpska Police Anti-Terrorist Brigade (PATB) is under SFOR control and surveillance, with SFOR liaison officers attached to each unit. The PATB units in northern Bosnia are already fully compliant with all the instructions issued by the Commander of SFOR on 15 August 1997. In south-eastern Bosnia, the delivery of SFOR-issued identity cards to PATB members is expected to be completed shortly. All Republika Srpska policemen continue to be encouraged to join the IPTF certification process.

10. Over the reporting period, no unauthorized checkpoints were reported. However, there were some reports of blocked roads, due largely to individuals participating in street demonstrations to protest against local conditions. These demonstrations were not organized by the entities and are thus not considered an overall threat to freedom of movement. SFOR and IPTF monitored every such situation without incident, and the roads were invariably cleared quickly.

11. A further impediment to freedom of movement occurred when railway traffic between Zenica and Zavidovice was suspended on 9 January 1998. The suspension was in response to several stoning incidents and was the first of its kind since June 1997. The cantonal police response has been to provide an additional police escort.

12. A regular bus line, authorized by the Office of the High Representative in early December, connecting Sarajevo and Banja Luka was operational for less than two weeks because the bus line and timetable had not been officially approved by the Bosnian Serb authorities. The Deputy High Representative warned that failure to re-establish the line was a direct violation of the Peace Agreement and that SFOR and IPTF would monitor the movement of buses and ensure unimpeded access. The bus line was subsequently re-established and is now operating on a daily basis without problems.

13. Over the reporting period SFOR monitored a total of 378 training and movement activities: 228 Bosniac, 51 Bosnian Croat, 96 Bosnian Serb and 3 Federation. A ban on all training and movement activities was imposed on the Butila unit of the Federation Rapid Reaction Brigade from 28 November 1997 until 31 January 1998 because of non-compliance during the municipal election and threatening behaviour. In addition, a 14-day ban (from 6 to 19 January) was imposed on the Bosnian Serb 14 Logistic Base and on the Educational Recruit

Centre as a result of their continual late notification of training cancellations.

14. Over the reporting period, SFOR monitored 65 demining operations, which resulted in the removal of 52 anti-personnel mines and 2 items of unexploded ordnance. SFOR has developed a training programme for instructors and team leaders in order to enable the entities to run their own courses in February and March, with the aim of increasing the number of deminers in the spring. The courses for the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosniacs started in Banja Luka and Tuzla, respectively on 24 December, with 30 students in each. The Bosnian Croat course started on 5 January in Mostar with 16 confirmed students. Reports indicate high student quality, enthusiasm and positive results. Although the number of demining operations for the past month has been low, overall compliance is deemed satisfactory, in view of the personnel and demining equipment in use in the courses and given the bad weather and the holiday period.

Cooperation with international organizations

15. Within its capabilities, SFOR continues to provide assistance to the international organizations in theatre and works routinely with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Office of the High Representative, IPTF, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

16. SFOR is continuing to support the installation phase of the municipal elections, primarily by providing a secure environment and area security and by supporting IPTF. SFOR also continues to participate in the OSCE election results implementation committees at the national and regional levels.

17. SFOR has been working closely with the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina to help them develop modalities for reconfiguring battle tanks as mine rollers within the framework of the arms control limitations agreed under article IV of annex 1 B of the Peace Agreement. The aim of this initiative is to enable the parties to use the tanks for mine-clearance work without fear of violating their arms control agreement.

18. SFOR continues to support the opening of additional airfields to civilian use. Over the reporting period, representatives from SFOR and the Office of the High Representative met with Bosnian Federation President Ganic and with Tuzla airport and canton officials to discuss arrangements for civilian aircraft to operate from Tuzla airfield. Similarly, in Sarajevo, SFOR has been meeting local airport officials and airline representatives to examine ways of increasing the number of slots available at the airport for civil passenger aircraft.

19. As reported last month (see S/1998/39, para. 15), SFOR had been negotiating with the Department of Civil Aviation and the Croatian and Serbian air-traffic control to make additional airspace available to facilitate civil aircraft overflights. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was, however, not prepared to sign the agreement and thus no progress can be reported.

Outlook

20. Tension is expected to remain in contested areas as the municipal election results continue to be implemented, and acts of intimidation and violence might occur in conjunction with the return of refugees and displaced persons.

UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1998/106
6 February 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 FEBRUARY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARMENIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to forward to you herewith the text of a statement issued on 5 February 1998 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Movses ABELIAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-02728 (E) 060298

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Annex

Statement issued on 5 February 1998 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia

Following recent events in Armenia, certain announcements are being made alleging that there is a danger that military operations will resume in the Nagorny Karabakh conflict zone. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia categorically rejects such unsubstantiated and exploitative statements and expresses serious concern in their regard.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers such statements and comments to be a deceptive interpretation of recent events which fundamentally obstruct the logical development of the Nagorny Karabakh peace process.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reasserts its commitment to adhere to the 12 May 1994 ceasefire and is firm in its determination to utilize all means to transform the ceasefire into a stable and durable peace.

Once again we affirm our unwavering position that the Nagorny Karabakh conflict must be resolved within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk process through negotiation.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is convinced that negotiation and dialogue represent the only path towards the establishment of stable peace and mutual trust in the region and towards the resolution of regional problems.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/107
9 February 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 FEBRUARY 1998 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF NIGERIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to forward, on behalf of Chief Tom Ikimi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria and Chairman of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone of the Economic Community of West African States, the text of the final communiqué issued at the end of the eighth meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, held in New York on 5 and 6 February 1998 (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Isaac E. AYEWAH
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

98-02854 (E) 090298

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Annex

Final communiqué of the eighth meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone of the Economic Community of West African States, held in New York on 5 and 6 February 1998

1. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Ministerial Committee of Five on Sierra Leone held its eighth meeting in New York on 5 and 6 February 1998.

2. All members of the Committee were present: Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Republic of Ghana, Republic of Guinea, Republic of Liberia, Federal Republic of Nigeria, the ECOWAS Executive Secretary and the representative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

3. Attending as observers were the Republic of Sierra Leone, represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to Sierra Leone.

4. The Ministers met with the Secretary-General on 5 February 1998 and briefed him on the latest situation in Sierra Leone. They expressed appreciation for the positive steps being initiated by the Secretary-General in support of ECOWAS initiatives in that country. They also met with the members of the Security Council under the Arria Formula on 6 February 1998 on the same subject. The members of the Security Council expressed their continued support for the steps being taken by the Committee of Five and the ECOWAS subregion on Sierra Leone. They promised their continued support for the ECOWAS peace efforts.

5. The Ministers reviewed the situation in Sierra Leone and expressed concern at the impasse that now existed in the implementation of the ECOWAS Peace Plan. They noted, in particular, the difficulty in the deployment of Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) troops and the United Nations Observer Mission throughout Sierra Leone, owing to the intransigence of the junta, who have resorted to reopening issues already agreed upon in the ECOWAS Peace Plan.

6. The Ministers emphasized that the ECOWAS Peace Plan remained the best framework for the resolution of the situation in Sierra Leone. They reaffirmed the three options available to ECOWAS in that regard, namely, (a) the pursuit of dialogue; (b) the imposition of sanctions/embargo; and (c) the possible use of force. The Ministers noted that the junta was now in breach of the ECOWAS Peace Plan and therefore called upon them to comply strictly with its provisions.

7. The Ministers noted that ECOMOG was already effectively deployed in certain parts of Sierra Leone, such as Lungi and Hastings airports, the Kossoh barracks and its environs, as well as in the territory of Sierra Leone near the border with Liberia. They suggested that the United Nations Observer Mission should be deployed alongside ECOMOG in the same manner and that the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Freetown should be carried out at the same time as that of the ECOMOG forces.

8. The Ministers emphasized that 22 April 1998 remained the terminal date for the restoration of the legitimate Government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. They therefore called upon the Security Council to reaffirm its commitment to that date and to take appropriate steps in support of that objective.

9. The Ministers noted that the ECOMOG Force Commander, in previous discussions with some members of the international community, had presented broad requirements of ECOMOG, the fulfilment of which would enable it to execute its mandate successfully in Sierra Leone. They appealed to the Secretary-General, the Security Council and the members of the international community at large to provide urgently the needed assistance and logistics support to ECOMOG.

10. The Ministers expressed concern that there had been flagrant violations of the sanctions imposed on the junta in Sierra Leone. They noted, specifically, the violations of the arms embargo and travel restrictions on members of the illegal regime and their families. Accordingly, they called on Members States of the United Nations to comply fully with the sanctions and embargo, as well as the travel restrictions imposed on members of the junta and those associated with them. They further appealed to the Security Council to take appropriate measures to ensure full compliance with the sanctions regime.

11. The Ministers noted the emergence of several initiatives on Sierra Leone. While welcoming the initiatives, they observed that, if not properly harmonized, the situation could be exploited by the junta to reopen negotiations on issues already agreed upon. They therefore stressed the need to harmonize those initiatives in line with the ECOWAS Peace Plan so that all actions could be focused on the central objective, which was the restoration of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to office by 22 April 1998.

12. The Ministers noted with concern the plight of refugees, their impact on neighbouring countries and the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone. They expressed appreciation to those countries which had rendered assistance to alleviate the impact of refugees in neighbouring countries. They called upon all Member States of the United Nations to give the necessary assistance to the countries in the subregion bearing the brunt of the refugee problem. They also called upon the junta to cooperate with ECOWAS in the implementation of the ECOWAS Peace Plan so that humanitarian corridors could be established to facilitate the delivery of relief materials to the people of Sierra Leone.

13. The Ministers welcomed the initiative to establish a contact group on Sierra Leone. They expressed appreciation for the agreement of the Secretary-General to co-chair, with ECOWAS, the launching of the contact group.

14. The Ministers expressed their appreciation for the pledges made by some countries to contribute to a trust fund for Sierra Leone and called on other Member States to make contributions whenever such a fund was established.

15. The Ministers briefed the Secretary-General and the members of the Security Council on the efforts made by the Chairman of ECOWAS for troop-contribution by member States of the subregion. They noted, with satisfaction, the favourable responses from States members of ECOWAS and called upon the Security Council and

members of the international community to provide all necessary assistance to ECOWAS to allow timely delivery of the troops to ECOMOG.

16. The Ministers expressed their profound appreciation to the Secretary-General and members of the Security Council for the support the United Nations had consistently given to the ECOWAS peace efforts in the subregion and their readiness to take additional measures in that regard.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/108
9 February 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 FEBRUARY 1998 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 661 (1990) CONCERNING THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith for the attention of the members of the Security Council the report of the Security Council Committee established by its resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6 (f) of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

The report was approved by the Committee on 9 February 1998.

(Signed) António MONTEIRO
Chairman
Security Council Committee established
by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the
situation between Iraq and Kuwait

98-02860 (E) 090298

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Annex

Report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6 (f) of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

1. The present report is submitted by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, in accordance with paragraph 6 (f) of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 approved by the Council in its resolution 700 (1991) of 17 June 1991 (S/22660, annex).

2. Under paragraph 6 (f) of the guidelines, the Committee is required to report at 90-day intervals to the Security Council on the implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq contained in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. The present report is the twenty-seventh of such reports submitted under the above-mentioned guidelines.

3. Under paragraph 12 of the guidelines, all States are requested to report to the Committee any information that may have come to their attention relating to possible violations of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq committed by other States or foreign nationals. During the period under review, the Committee has not received any such information.

4. In accordance with paragraphs 13 and 15 of the guidelines, all States and international organizations are required to consult the Committee on the question of whether certain items fall within the provisions of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), as well as in cases relating to dual-use or multiple-use items, that is, items meant for civilian use but with potential for diversion or conversion to military use. During the period covered by the present report, no States or international organizations have consulted the Committee on these questions.

5. In paragraph 14 of the guidelines, international organizations are requested to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring full compliance with the arms and related sanctions against Iraq, including providing to the Committee any relevant information that may come to their attention. During the period under review, no information as requested in paragraph 14 of the guidelines has been brought to the attention of the Committee.

6. The Committee will continue its efforts to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council. Since the last report of the Secretary-General, dated 4 December 1991 (S/22884/Add.2), no further communications have been received from Member States pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 700 (1991).

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/109
9 February 1998
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 7 FEBRUARY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that violations of Iraq's airspace by United States aircraft continued between 1 and 4 February 1998 and that the aircraft in question carried out reconnaissance and engaged in acts of provocation, as set forth in the annex hereto.

Your intervention is requested with a view to bringing a halt to actions that, as flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, pose a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq.

These actions continue to alarm the civilian population and to cause serious damage to private and public property. The Republic of Iraq affirms its right to seek legal compensation for the damage being inflicted on the Iraqi people and the Iraqi State by these actions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Violations of Iraq's airspace and damage caused, 1-4 February 1998

1. In the northern region 52 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following cities and towns: Dohuk, Mosul, Amadiyah, Aqrah, Zakho, Irbil, Tall Afar, Baibo and Rawanduz.

2. In the southern region 268 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Nasiriyah, Samawah, Artawi, Ushbayjah, Jalibah, Salman, Busayyah, Qurnah, Chabaish, Shinafiyah, Rumaythah, Habbariyah, Rahhaliyah, Basrah, Hayy, Shatrah, Amarah, Diwaniyah, Rifa'i, Najaf, Qal'at Salih, Maymunah, Ali al-Sharqi, Afak and Ukhaydir.

3. Two violations were committed by TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at altitudes of 20,000 metres and at speeds of 600 kilometres per hour.

4. At 0845 hours on 30 January 1998 a United States helicopter from frigate No. 58, on station in the Arabian Gulf, overflew merchant vessels on their way to the port of Umm Qasr.

5. At 1406, 1435, 1500 and 1505 hours on 31 January 1998 United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr and Faw areas.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1998/110
10 February 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 FEBRUARY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by Mr. Heydar Aliyev, President of the Azerbaijani Republic, issued on 5 February 1998 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Eldar KOULIYEV
Permanent Representative

98-02990 (E) 110298 110298 120298

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Annex

[Original: Russian]

Statement by the President of the Azerbaijani Republic
issued on 5 February 1998

In Azerbaijan, we have recently been following with concern the situation in Armenia and all the events that have occurred there in recent days - the resignation of Levon Ter-Petrossian from the post of President of Armenia. I consider it necessary to state that Azerbaijan has firmly held the position based on a peaceful settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. We shall continue to hold this position in the future as well.

I consider the ceasefire brought about in May 1994 a major achievement; and the efforts by Azerbaijan and Armenia in the intervening years have made it possible to maintain the ceasefire regime.

I state today that we shall remain faithful to the ceasefire regime and shall do everything to ensure that the ceasefire regime is maintained.

I hope that the internal situation in Armenia will soon stabilize and that we shall continue the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on a peaceful settlement of the conflict in accordance with the Lisbon principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). I believe that, with the participation and mediation of the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group - the Russian Federation, the United States of America and France, we shall be able to continue the peaceful negotiation process and, on the basis of what has been attained thus far, achieve complete peace in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

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S/1998/111
10 February 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 FEBRUARY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the position of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic vis-à-vis Security Council document S/1998/44, dated 9 January 1998 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mikhail WEHBE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-02996 (E) 100298



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Annex

[Original: Arabic]

Letter dated 9 February 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

With reference to document S/1998/44 of 9 January 1998 concerning the deletion of certain items from the list of matters of which the Security Council is currently seized, I wish to make the following observations:

1. On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic is strongly opposed to the deletion of item 29, entitled "Letter dated 4 February 1986 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17787)", since the letter in question refers to irrefutable evidence that Israel engages in State terrorism and flouts the will of the international community, which is opposed to such terrorism and wages an ongoing struggle against policies of this kind.

2. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic is equally opposed to the deletion of items 1 ("The Palestine question"), 17 ("The Middle East problem, including the Palestinian question") and 20 ("The question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights"). These items are extremely important, especially since the present Israeli Government is completely ignoring United Nations resolutions, the principle of "land for peace" and the will of the international community, and the question of Palestine falls within the jurisdiction of the Security Council, which is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.

It is highly regrettable that the Security Council has not considered the above matters because of opposition from the United States of America, which refuses to allow these matters to be discussed on the pretext that talks are currently ongoing between the parties in the context of the peace process.

3. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reiterates the view expressed in its earlier letter, dated 26 August 1996, namely, that the retention of items on the list for just one year is an unacceptable rule which was adopted without consulting the Member States of the United Nations, who were confronted with a fait accompli following a decision which they did not take on an issue on which they were not consulted. What is more, the selective deletion of items which the Security Council has not considered in formal meetings during the preceding five-year period is a dangerous departure from the manner in which the Security Council should, ideally, consider certain important issues.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic believes that the Security Council's task goes well beyond simplifying the list of matters of which it is seized or deleting certain items from it, and calls upon the Council to reconsider its decision in the interests of international peace and security.

(Signed) Mikhail WEHBE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/112
10 February 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 13 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1132 (1997)

1. Following the military coup of 25 May 1997 in Sierra Leone that overthrew the democratically elected Government, and having determined that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security in the region, on 8 October 1997, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted resolution 1132 (1997) imposing mandatory sanctions against the military junta in Sierra Leone.

2. In paragraph 11 of the resolution, the Security Council called upon all States and all international and regional organizations to act strictly in accordance with the relevant provisions of the resolution.

3. Under paragraph 13 of the same resolution, the Council requested all States to report to the Secretary-General within 30 days of the date of adoption of the resolution on steps they had taken to give effect to the provisions set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the resolution. On 16 October 1997, the Secretary-General transmitted a note verbale to all States, international organizations and specialized agencies requesting them to provide information on steps they had taken to comply with that request.

4. As at 4 February 1998, 37 replies had been received pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 1132 (1997). Each of the replies has been issued as a document of the Security Council, as indicated below:

1. Japan	30 October 1997	S/1997/860
2. Oman	30 October 1997	S/1997/861
3. Singapore	6 November 1997	S/1997/862
4. Lebanon	6 November 1997	S/1997/877
5. Sweden	7 November 1997	S/1997/870
6. Czech Republic	7 November 1997	S/1997/878
7. Cyprus	10 November 1997	S/1997/879

8.	New Zealand	10 November 1997	S/1997/901
9.	Germany	12 November 1997	S/1997/916
10.	Malta	17 November 1997	S/1997/917
11.	Monaco	26 November 1997	S/1997/947
12.	Chile	2 December 1997	S/1997/946
13.	Slovakia	2 December 1997	S/1997/957
14.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2 December 1997	S/1997/965
15.	Luxembourg (on behalf of the European Union)	9 December 1997	S/1997/972
16.	Greece	9 December 1997	S/1997/1004
17.	France	10 December 1997	S/1997/1005
18.	Portugal	11 December 1997	S/1997/982
19.	Austria	12 December 1997	S/1997/983
20.	Ukraine	15 December 1997	S/1997/992
21.	Thailand	16 December 1997	S/1997/993
22.	Russian Federation	18 December 1997	S/1997/1008
23.	Norway	18 December 1997	S/1997/1012
24.	Italy	9 January 1998	S/1998/45
25.	Switzerland	12 January 1998	S/1998/41
26.	Republic of Korea	13 January 1998	S/1998/64
27.	Luxembourg	15 January 1998	S/1998/72
28.	Brazil	16 January 1998	S/1998/54
29.	Cyprus	16 January 1998	S/1998/55
30.	Liechtenstein	19 January 1998	S/1998/65
31.	Australia	19 January 1998	S/1998/66
32.	Ethiopia	20 January 1998	S/1998/71
33.	Ghana	21 January 1998	S/1998/91
34.	Turkey	23 January 1998	S/1998/87
35.	United States of America	27 January 1998	S/1998/98
36.	Russian Federation	28 January 1998	S/1998/93
37.	Islamic Republic of Iran	28 January 1998	S/1998/99